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Abstract
Quantum mechanics traditionally places the observer ‘outside’ of the
system being studied and employs the Born interpretation. In this and
related papers the observer is placed ‘inside’ the system. To accomplish
this, special rules are required to engage and interpret the Schro¨dinger
solutions in individual measurements. The rules in this paper (called the
oRules) do not include the Born rule that connects probability with square
modulus.
It is required that the rules allow conscious observers to exist inside
the system without empirical ambiguity – reflecting our own unambiguous
experience in the universe. This requirement is satisfied by the oRules.
These rules are restricted to observer measurements, so state reduction
can only occur when an observer is present.
Introduction
The method of this paper differs from that of traditional quantum mechanics
in that it sees the observer in an ontological rather than an epistemological
context. Traditional or standard quantum theory (i.e., Copenhagen) places the
observer outside of the system where operators and/or operations are used to
obtain information about the system. This is the epistemological model shown
in fig. 1. The observer cannot here make continuous contact with the system
– only instantaneous contact.
The large OP in fig. 1 might be a mathematical ‘operator’ or a corresponding
physical ‘operation’. The observer makes a measurement by choosing a formal
operator that is associated with a chosen laboratory operation. As a result,
the observer is forever outside of the observed system – making operational
choices. The observer is forced to act apart from the system as one who poses
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The systemObserver
The OP
Figure 1: Epistemological Model (Copenhagen)
theoretical and experimental questions to the system. This model is both useful
and epistemologically sound.
However, the special rules developed in this paper apply to the system by
itself, independent of the possibility that an observer may be inside, and disre-
garding everything on the outside. This is the ontological model shown in fig. 2.
The system
May or may not include observer
Figure 2: Ontological Model (requires special rules)
A measurement occurring inside this system is not represented by a formal
operator. Rather, it is represented by a physical device that is itself part of
the system. If the sub-system being measured is S and a detector is D, then a
measurement interaction is given by the entanglement Φ = SD. If an observer
joins the system in order to look at the detector, then the system state becomes
Φ = SDB, where B is the brain state of the observer. Contact between the
observer and the observed is continuous in this case.
The ontological model is able to place the observer inside the universe of
things and give a full account of his conscious experience there. It is a more
realistic view of the relationship between the observer and the rest of the uni-
verse, inasmuch as a conscious observer is always ‘in principle’ includable in a
wider system. The ontological model is a departure from the traditional the-
ory and has three defining characteristics: (1) It includes observations given
by Φ = SDB, (2) it allows conscious observations to be continuous, and (3) it
rejects the Born rule. In place of the Born rule, special rules like the oRules of
this paper allow physics to unambiguously predict the continuous experience of
an observer in the system.
Quantum mechanical measurement is sometimes said to refer to ensembles
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of observations but not to individual observations. In this paper we propose a
set of four special rules that apply to individual measurements in the ontological
model. They are called oRules (1-4), and do not include the long-standing Born
interpretation of quantum mechanics. Instead, probability is introduced (only)
through the notion of probability current. Furthermore, these rules describe state
reductions (i.e., stochastic reductions or collapses) that are associated with an
‘observer’ type measurement – that is, they occur only in the presence of an
observer. To this extent, they reflect the views of Wigner [1] and von Neumann
[2]. The oRules are demonstrated below in several different physical situations.
I claim that they are a consistent and complete set of rules that are capable of
giving an ontological description of any individual measurement or interaction
in quantum mechanics.
The oRules (1-4) are also to be found under the name “rules (1-4)” in an
earlier paper [3], where they are developed somewhat differently.
These rules are not themselves a formal theory of measurement. I make no
attempt to understand why they work, but strive only to insure that they do
work. Presumably, a formal theory can one day be found to explain these rules
in the same way that atomic theory explains the empirically discovered rules of
atomic spectra, or in the way that current theories of measurement aspire to
merge with standard quantum mechanics, or make the neurological connection
with conscious observation.
Another Rule-Set
Another rule-set called the nRules (1-4) are given in detail in another paper [4].
These are similar to the oRules except that they allow both an observer type
measurement and an objective type measurement. The former type occurs only
in the presence of an observer, whereas the latter takes place independent of
an observer. These rules therefore come closer to the spirit of traditional mea-
surement theory than do the oRules, but they are still a significant departure
because they also introduce probability through the notion of ‘probability cur-
rent’ rather than square modulus and because they address the state reduction
of conscious individuals in an ontological context.
Purpose of Rule-Sets
It is possible to have an empirical science using the epistemological model with-
out explicitly talking about consciousness. This is because it is always assumed
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that the outside observer is conscious, so there is no need to make a theoretical
point of it.
However, in the ontological model, everything that exists is in principle
included in the system. So if quantum mechanics is to be an empirical science,
then the system must provide for the existence of conscious brains that can
make empirical observations. This means that the theory must be told when
and how conscious brain states appear so that an empirical science is possible
within the model. Special rules like one of the above rule-sets are required for
this purpose.
I emphasize again that these rule-sets are not alternative theories that seek to
replace the statistical formalism of von Neumann. Each applies to individuals,
and is like an empirical formula that requires a wider theoretical framework
in order to be understood – a framework that is presently unknown. I do not
finally choose one of the rule-sets or propose an explanatory theory. I am only
concerned with the ways in which state reduction might work in each case.
The Interaction: Particle and Detector
Before introducing an observer into this ontological model, consider an inter-
acting particle and detector system by itself. These two objects are assumed to
be initially independent and given by the equation
Φ(t) = exp(−iHt)ψi ⊗ di (1)
where ψi is the initial particle state and di is the initial detector state. The
particle is then allowed to pass over the detector, where the two interact with a
cross section that may or may not result in the capture. After the interaction
begins at a time t0, the state is an entanglement in which the particle variables
and the detector variables are not separable.
However, we let φ(t ≥ t0) be in a representation whose components can
be grouped so that the first component includes the detector d0 in its ground
state prior to capture, and the second component includes the detector d1 in its
capture state. There is then a clear discontinuity or “quantum jump” between
the two components. The captured particle is included in d1 in the second
component, giving
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Φ(t ≥ t0) = ψ(t)d0 + d1(t) (2)
where d1(t) is equal to zero at t0 and increases with time
1,2. ψ(t) is a free particle
as a function of time, including all the incoming and scattered components. It
does no harm and it is convenient to let ψ(t) carry the total time dependence
of the first component, and to let d0 be normalized throughout
3.
The first component in eq. 2 is a superposition of all possible scattered
waves of ψ(t) in product with all possible recoil states of the ground state
detector, so d0 is a spread of states including all the recoil possibilities together
with their correlated environments. The second component is also an entangled
superposition of this kind. This one includes all the recoil components of the
detector that have captured the particle. There will be no state reduction
of eq. 2 in this oRule treatment because there is no observer present. The
interaction will continue until it is complete at a time tf , after which time
Φ(t ≥ tf > t0) = ψ(t)d0 + d1(tf )
Add an Observer
Assume that an observer is looking at the detector in eq. 1 from the beginning.
Φ(t) = exp(−iHt)ψ(t)i ⊗DiBi
where Bi is the initial brain state of the observer that is entangled with the
detector. This brain is understood to include only higher order brain parts
– that is, the physiology of the brain that is directly associated with conscious-
ness after all image processing is complete. All lower order physiology leading
to Bi is assumed to be part of the detector. The detector is now represented
by a capital D, indicating that it includes the bare detector by itself plus the
low-level physiology of the observer.
1Each component in eq. 2 has an attached environmental term E0 and E1. These are
orthogonal, insuring local decoherence. The equation appears to be a mixture because these
terms are not shown. However, eq. 2 (including the environmental terms) and others like
it are fully coherent superpositions, and in the following we will call them “superpositions”,
reflecting their global rather than their local properties.
2Superpositions of environmentally isolated macroscopic states have been found at low
temperatures [5]. These superpositions are observed through interference effects between
them. Although no such interference exists in eq. 2, we nonetheless assume that the locally
decoherent macroscopic states d0 and d1 are in global superposition.
3Equation 2 can be written with coefficients c0(t) and c1(t) giving Φ(t ≥ t0) = c0(t)ψ(t)d0+
c1(t)d1, where all three states ψ(t), d0, and d1 are normalized throughout. We let c0(t)ψ(t)
in this expression be equal to ψ(t) in eq. 2, and let c1(t)d1 be equal to d1(t) in eq. 2.
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Following the interaction between the particle and the detector we will have
Φ(t ≥ t0) = ψ(t)D0B0 +D1(t)B1 (3)
where B0 is the observer’s brain when the detector is observed to be in its
ground state D0, and B1 is the brain state when the detector is observed to be
in its capture state D1.
If the interaction is long lived compared to the time it takes for the detector
to record the changes in eq. 3, then the superposition in that equation might ex-
ist for a long time before a capture causes a state reduction. This suggests that
there are two active brain states of this observer that might be simultaneously
observing the detector, where one sees the detector in its ground state and the
other sees it in its capture state. The equation therefore invites a paradoxical
interpretation like that associated with Schro¨dinger’s cat. This ambiguity can-
not be allowed. The oRules of this paper must not only provide for a stochastic
trigger that gives rise to a state reduction, and describe that reduction, they
must also insure than an empirical ambiguity of this kind does not exist.
To this end we introduce dual brain state categories ‘realized’ and ‘ready’,
where realized brain states are conscious, and may be thought of as more “real”
than ready brain states that are not conscious. The latter are only on stand-by,
ready to be stochastically chosen and converted to conscious states after state
reduction.
Ready Brains
A realized brain state B (not underlined) is assumed to be conscious of something
with which it is entangled – like B0 is aware of D0 in eq. 3. The corresponding
ready brain state B (underlined) has the same content as its partner B except
that it is not conscious. That is not to say that B is unconscious. It is more
like a ‘potential’ state of the conscious state B. In the following, an active brain
state is defined to be one that is actively engaged in an observation – i.e., it is
realized or ready but not unconscious of the object in question. There are four
symbols that may be used to represent brain states.
B realized brain state – an active brain state that is understood to
be conscious.
B ready brain state – an active brain state with the same content
as B, except that it is not conscious. Ready brain states are
always underlined.
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Bb brink state – an inactive brain state that is on the brink of
becoming an active brain state. Inactive with respect to B
means: neither B nor B.
X unknown brain state
The oRules
The first rule establishes the existence of a stochastic trigger. This is a property
of the system that has nothing to do with the kind of interaction taking place
or its representation. Apart from making a choice, the trigger by itself has no
effect on anything. It initiates a state reduction only when it is combined with
oRules 2 and 3.
nRule (1): For any subsystem of n components in a system having a total
square modulus equal to s, the probability per unit time of a stochastic choice of
one of those components at time t is given by (ΣnJn)/s, where the net probability
current Jn going into the n
th component at that time is positive.
The second rule specifies the conditions under which ready brain states ap-
pear in solutions of Schro¨dinger’s equation. These are understood to be the
basis states of a state reduction4.
oRule (2): If an interaction produces new components that are discontinuous
with the initial state or with each other, then all of the active brain states in the
new components will be ready brain states.
[note: Continuous means, continuous in all variables. Although solutions to
Schro¨dinger’s equation change continuously in time, they can be discontinuous in
other variables – e.g., the separation between the nth and the (n+1)th orbit of an
atom with no orbits in between. Of course atomic states are generally coherent,
but a discontinuity of this kind can also exist between macroscopic states that
are decoherent. For instance, the displaced detector states D0 (ground state)
and D1 (capture state) are discontinuous with respect to detector variables.
There is no eigenstate D1/2 in between. Like atomic orbits, these two detector
states are a ‘quantum jump’ apart.]
[note: The initial state is the initial state of the system that appears in a given
solution of Schro¨dinger’s equation. A particular solution is defined by a unique
4The wording of oRule (2) and oRule (3) is slightly different from the published wording
of rule (2) and rule (3) in ref. 1.
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set of boundary conditions. So eqs. 1 and 2 are both included in the single
solution that contains the discontinuity between d0 and d1, where eq. 1 is the
initial state. However, boundary conditions change with the collapse of the wave
function, so the component that survives a collapse becomes the initial state of
the new solution.]
oRule (3): If a component containing ready brain states is stochastically cho-
sen, then those states will become realized (i.e., conscious) brain states, and all
other components in the superposition will be immediately reduced to zero.
[note: The claim of an immediate (i.e., discontinuous) reduction is the simplest
way of describing the collapse of the state function. The collapse is brought
about by an instantaneous change in the boundary conditions of the Schro¨dinger
equation, rather than by the introduction of a new ‘continuous’ mechanism of
some kind. A continuous modification can be added later (with a modification
of oRule 3) if that is seen to be necessary5.]
[note: This collapse does not generally preserve normalization. That does not
alter the probability in subsequent reductions because of the way probability per
unit time is defined in oRule (1) – that is, divided by the total square modulus.]
The fourth oRule forbids transitions from components containing ready
states to other components. Only positive current going into ready states is
physically meaningful because positive current represents a positive probability
of reduction. A negative current (coming out of a ready brain state) is not
physically meaningful, and is not allowed by oRule (4).
oRule (4): If a component in a superposition is entangled with a ready brain
state, then that component can only receive probability current.
If an interaction does not produce ready brain components that are discon-
tinuous with the given states or with each other, then the Hamiltonian will
develop the state in the usual way, independent of these rules. If the stochastic
trigger selects a component that does not contain ready brain states, then there
will be no oRule (3) state reduction.
5The new boundary comes from a stochastic hit on one of the available eigenvalues, which
is the new boundary. In this treatment the stochastic trigger is intrinsically discontinuous
and imposes that discontinuity on the developing wave function. This is the simplest way to
account for the sudden change that takes place, and it spares our having to explain where a
change producing continuous mechanism ‘comes from’.
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Apply to Interaction
When these rules are applied to eq. 3, we have
Φ(t ≥ t0) = ψ(t)D0B0 +D1(t)B1 (4)
where the brain state in D1(t)B1 is a ready state by virtue of oRule (2), so it is
not conscious. Since there is only one conscious brain state in this superposition,
a cat-like ambiguity is avoided. Equation 4 (with underline) now replaces eq. 3.
Equation 4 is the state of the system before there is a stochastic hit that
produces a state reduction. The observer is here consciously aware of the de-
tector in its ground state D0, for the brain state B0 is correlated with D0. If
there is a capture, then there will be a stochastic hit on the second component
in eq. 4 at a time tsc. This will reduce the first component to zero according to
oRule (3), and convert the ready state in eq. 4 into a conscious brain state.
Φ(t ≥ tsc > t0) = D1(t)B1 (5)
Standard quantum mechanics (without these rules) gives us eq. 3 by the
same logic that it gives us Schro¨dinger’s cat and Everett’s many worlds. Equa-
tion 3 is a single equation that simultaneously presents two different conscious
brain states, thus assuring an unacceptable ambiguity. However with these
oRules in effect, the Schro¨dinger solution is properly grounded in observation,
allowing the rules to correctly and unambiguously predict the experience of the
observer. This replaces ‘one’ equation eq. 3 with ‘two’ equations in eqs. 4 and 5.
Equation 4 describes the state of the system before capture, and eq. 5 describes
the state of the system after capture. Before and after are two different so-
lutions to Schro¨dinger’s equation, specified by different boundary conditions.
Remember, we said that the stochastic trigger selects the (new) boundary that
applies to the reduced state. So it is the stochastic event that separates the two
solutions – defining before and after.
If there is no stochastic hit on the second component in eq. 4, then it will
become a phantom component. A component is a phantom when there is no
longer any probability current flowing into it (in this case because the interaction
is complete), and when there can be no current flowing out of it because it is
composed of ready states that comply with oRule (4). A phantom component
can be dropped out of the equation without consequence. Doing so only changes
the definition of the system. It is the same kind of redefinition that occurs
in standard practice when one chooses to renormalize a system at some new
starting time. Keeping a phantom is like keeping the initial system. Because of
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nRule (3), kept phantoms are reduced to zero whenever another component is
stochastically chosen.
If there is no stochastic hit in eq. 4, then the new system (dropping the
phantom D1B0) is just the first component of that equation. This corresponds
to the observer continuing to see the ground state detector D0, as he should in
this case.
A Terminal Observation
An observer who is inside a system must be able to confirm the validity of the
Born rule that is normally applied from the outside. To show this, suppose our
observer is not aware of the detector during the interaction with the particle as
in eq. 2, but he looks at the detector after the interaction is complete. During
the interaction we then have
Φ(tf > t > t0) = [ψ(t)d0 + d1(t)]⊗X
where tf is the time of completion, and X is the unknown state of the observer
prior to the physiological interaction6.
After the interaction is complete and before the observer looks at the detector
Φ(t ≥ tf > t0) = [ψ(t)d0 + d1(tf )]⊗X
where there is no longer a probability current flow inside the brackets. When
the observer finally looks at the detector at time tlook, we have
Φ(t ≥ tlook > tf > t0) = [ψ(t)d0 + d1(tf )]⊗X (6)
→ [ψ′(t)D0 +D1(tf )]B
b
where the physiological process (represented by the arrow) carries ⊗X into Bb,
d0 into D0, and d1 into D1 by a continuous classical progression leading from
independence to entanglement. The brain state Bb is understood to be an
inactive state on the brink of becoming active. There are as yet no conscious
states in eq. 6 because the process has not gotten beyond the brink state – i.e.,
all the brain states in eq. 6 are inactive with respect to the detector.
During this process the observer will be unable to distinguish between the
two detector states D0 and D1, which is why his brain is called inactive at
6The “decision” of the observer to look at the detector is assumed to be deterministically
internal in the ontological model. In this respect, the ontological model is like classical physics.
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this time. However, at the moment of observation tob, he will resolve the dif-
ference between these states, and when that happens a continuous ‘classical’
evolution will no longer be possible. The solution will then branch “quantum
mechanically” into two components that separately recognize D0 and D1.
Φ(t ≥ tob > tlook > tf > t0) = ψ(t)D0B
b +D1(tf )B
b (7)
+ ψ′(t)D0B0 +D
′
1(tf )B1
where the components in the second row are zero at tob and increase in time.
Current flows vertically during this active phase of the physiological interaction.
The states in the second row are discontinuous from each other (i.e., D0 and D1
are discontinuous) and contain active brain states. They are therefore required
by oRule (2) to be ready states. It is here that the non-conscious nature of
ready states is important. Otherwise, eq. 7 would give us an ambiguous dual
conscious (cat-like) result.
With probability current flowing into the second row of eq. 7, there is a
probability equal to 1.0 that one of those components will be stochastically
chosen. If the third component is chosen at a time tsc3, then oRule (3) will give
Φ(t ≥ tsc3 > tob > tlook > tf > t0) = ψ(t)D0B0 (8)
indicating that the terminal observer finds that the particle was not captured
during the primary interaction.
If the fourth component is chosen at a time tsc4, then oRule (3) will give
Φ(t ≥ tsc4 > tob > tlook > tf > t0) = D1(tsc4)B1 (9)
indicating that the terminal observer finds that the particle was captured during
the primary interaction. The probability of eq. 8 plus eq. 9 is equal to 1.0,
thereby confirming the Born interpretation.
An Intermediate Case
In eq. 4 the observer is assumed to interact with the detector from the begin-
ning. Suppose that the incoming particle results from a long half-life decay, and
that the observer’s physiological involvement only begins in the middle of that
interaction. Before that time we have
Φ(t ≥ t0) = [ψ(t)d0 + d1(t)]⊗X
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where again X is the unknown brain state of the observer prior to the physio-
logical interaction. Primary probability current here flows between the detector
components inside the bracket.
Let the observer interact with the detector at some time tlook giving
Φ(t ≥ tlook > t0) = [ψ(t)d0 + d1(t)]⊗X
→ [ψ′(t)D0 +D1(t)]B
b
where the physiological process (represented by the arrow) carries ⊗X into Bb,
d0 into D0, and d1 into D1 by a continuous classical progression leading from
independence to entanglement. The state Bb is again understood to be an
inactive brain state on the brink of becoming active. As before, the observer
will be unable to distinguish between the two detector states D0 and D1 during
this process. A resolution occurs at time tob leading to
Φ(t ≥ tob > tlook > t0) = ψ(t)D0B
b +D1(t)B
b (10)
+ ψ′(t)D0B0 +D
′
1(t)B1
where the ready brain components in the second row are zero at tob and increase
in time. Probability current flows vertically into those components during the
active phase of the physiological interaction. Primary current flows horizontally
in the first row but not between the ready components in the second row because
B1 cannot receive current from B0 according to oRule (4).
All of the current from the first component in eq. 10 will either collect in
the third component or in the fourth component via the second component.
The significance of oRule (4) in this case is that once probability is assigned to
the third component, it cannot be passed along to the fourth component. The
significance of the non-conscious nature of the ready states is the same as it is
in eq. 7 – i.e., that the second row in eq. 10 will not give ambiguous results.
If the vertical current going into the fourth component D′1(t)B1 of eq. 10
results in a stochastic hit at time tsc4, the resulting state reduction will be
Φ(t ≥ tsc4 > tob > tlook > t0) = D1(tsc4)B1 (11)
indicating that the capture had already occurred by the time of the observation.
We said that the primary interaction is still in progress when the observer looks
at the detector. This means that an observation may reveal a prior capture,
even though the actual reduction does not occur (in these oRules) until the
observer makes an observation.
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If the current going into the third component ψ′(t)D0B0 of eq. 10 gives rise
to a stochastic hit at time tsc3, the resulting state reduction will be
Φ(t ≥ tsc3 > tob > tlook > t0) = ψ
′(t)D0B0 +D1(t)B1 (12)
where the second component is zero at tsc3 and increases in time because the
primary interaction is still going on. If there is stochastic hit on this component
at a later time tsc32 > tsc3, then there will be a further reduction giving
Φ(t ≥ tsc32 > tsc3 > tob > tlook > t0) = D1(tsc32)B1 (13)
indicating that the observer first came on board at tsc3 and found that the
capture had not yet occurred. Then he witnessed the capture at tsc32.
If the primary interaction in eq. 12 runs out before there is a stochastic hit
on the second component, then this equation will go unchanged, except that
the time dependence of D1(t) will be removed when the interaction is complete
at time tf giving D1(tf ). In this case, the second component D1(tf )B1 will
become a phantom and can be ignored.
A Second Observer
If a second observer is standing by while the first observer interacts with the
detector, the state function will be
Φ(t ≥ t0) = [ψ(t)D0B0 +D1(t)B1]⊗X
where X is an unknown state of the second observer prior to his interacting with
the system. The detector D here includes the low-level physiology of the first
observer. When a product of brain states appears in the form BB or B⊗X , the
first term will refer to the first observer and the second to the second observer.
If the second observer interacts with the detector at time tob (skipping tlook)
the result of the physiological interaction would seem to be
Φ(t ≥ tob > t0) = ψ(t)D0B0B
b +D1(t)B1B
b (14)
+ ψ′(t)D0B0B0 +D
′
1(t)B1B1
where the second row follows from the active physiological interaction and
oRule (2). A further expansion of the detector is assumed to include the low-
level physiology of the second observer.
However, the fourth component of eq. 14 will remain zero amplitude because
oRule (4) forbids a physiological current to flow into it from either the second
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or third component. In addition, the third component evolves continuously
from the first component. Therefore, since there is no other product of the
psychological interaction that is discontinuous with it, the third component is
not required by oRule (2) to be a ready state. So beginning with tlook, the
solution generated by the physiological interaction and going through to just
past tob will carry the first component of eq. 14 into ψ(t)D0B0B0 by a continuous
classical process giving
Φ = ψ(tlook)D0B0 ⊗X → ψ(ti)D0B0B
i
→ ψ(tob+)D0B0B0 (15)
+ D1(tlook)B1 ⊗X → D1(ti)B1B
i
→ D1(tob+)B1B1
instead of eq. 14. The index i refers to any time between tlook and tob when the
inactive brain state of the second observer is Bi. The first row of this equation
is the single component that carries the observer all the way from independence
to entanglement. The arrows represent the brain going continuously from X
to B0.
The primary interaction is still active during this time, and this gives rise to
a vertical current going from the first to the second row in eq. 15. The second
row is therefore a continuum of components that are created parallel to the first
row at each moment of time. So at the time tob+, vertical current flows only
into the final component in the second row of eq. 15. Components prior the
last one no longer have current flowing into them from above, and since there
is no horizontal current among these ready states, they become phantom states
as soon as they are created. Therefore, when the interaction is complete after
tob+ eq. 15 is
Φ(t ≥ tob+ > tlook > t0) = ψ(t)D0B0B0 +D1(t)B1B1 (16)
where D1(t)B1B1 is zero at tob and increases in time. This equation is the same
as eq. 4 except that it includes two observers; so from this point on, it is as
though both observers have been on board from the beginning.
Suppose the primary interaction terminates before the second observer is
fully on board. Let it terminate at time ti. Then there will be no further
evolution after that time in the second row of eq. 15; so the entire second row
will be made up of phantom components. Following time tob we will then have
just
Φ(t ≥ tob+ > tlook > t0) = ψ(t)D0B0B0 (17)
This says that both observers experience the detector in its ground state at
the end of the interaction. There was no capture before time ti; and since the
interaction is terminated, there is no further prospect of a capture.
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Instead of terminating the interaction at time ti, suppose there is a stochastic
hit at that time. In that case, the second component in the second row of eq. 15
will be chosen to give
Φ(t = ti > tlook > t0) = D1(ti)B1B
i
The inactive state Bi will then continue its evolution so that we finally have
Φ(t ≥ ti > tlook > t0) = D1(ti)B1B
i
→ D1(ti)B1B1 (18)
Anomaly Avoided
The fourth oRule avoids a catastrophic anomaly if the primary interaction is
complete at time tf without a capture, and before the second observer looks at
the detector.
Φ(t ≥ tf > t0) = [ψ(t)D0B0 +D1(tf )B1]⊗X
After the second observer observes the detector at tob we will have
Φ(t ≥ tob > tf > t0) = ψ(t)D0B0B
b +D1(tf )B1B
b (19)
+ ψ′(t)D0B0B1 +D
′
1(tf )B1B1
where the second row is zero at tob and increases in time. This differs from
eq. 14 only in that the primary interaction is already complete. There is no
horizontal current flow.
Assume that oRule (4) is not in effect. In that case the fourth component
D′1(tf )B1B1 in eq. 19 would be accessible to current from the second component.
A stochastic hit at some time tsc4 would then be possible, yielding
Φ(t ≥ tsc4 > tob > tf > t0) = D1(tf )B1B1
This says that even though the first observer can testify that the interaction
has been completed without a capture, both observers will experience a capture
when the second observer comes on board – some time after the interaction is
completed. That is absurd. The fourth oRule therefore plays the essential role
in preventing absurdities of this kind.
A Counter
In the previous sections we have seen how the oRules go about including ob-
servers inside a system in an ontological model. The rules describe when and
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how the observer becomes conscious of measuring instruments; and furthermore,
they replicate common empirical experience in these situations. In the next few
sections we turn attention to another problem – the requirement that observed
macroscopic states must appear in their normal sequence. This sequencing chore
represents a major application of oRule (4) that is best illustrated in the case
of a macroscopic counter.
Consider a β counter in the ontological model where an observer interacts
with the counter. If the counter is turned on at time t0, its state function will
be given by
Φ(t ≥ t0) = C0(t)B0 + C1(t)B1 (20)
where C1(t)B1 is zero at t0 and increases in time. C0 is a counter that reads
zero counts, and B0 is an entangled conscious brain state that experiences the
counter reading zero counts. C1 reads one count, and C2 (not shown) reads two
counts, etc. The ready brain state B1 appears as required by oRule (2).
Components beyond C1(t)B1 do not appear in eq. 20 because current can-
not leave that component according to oRule (4). Therefore, the 0th and the
1st components are the only ones that are actively involved before there is a
stochastic hit of any kind. Before that time, the only current flow will be J01
from the 0th to the 1st component. The resulting distribution at some time
t < tsc is shown in fig. 3, where tsc is the time of a stochastic hit on the second
component.
This means that because of oRule (4), the 1st component will be chosen
because all of the current from the (say, normalized) 0th component will pore
into the 1st component making
∫
J01dt = 1.0. The first two dial readings will
therefore be sequential, going from 0 to 1 without skipping a step such as going
from 0 to 2.
1
2 3
Ready
Ready Ready
J01
0
1
Square moduli at time t 
scbefore tRealized
Figure 3
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Unobserved macroscopic counters will develop as a superposition of states
(see next section), allowing the first stochastic hit to occur on any component
C1, C2, C3, etc. However, oRule (4) enforces a no-skip behavior of macroscopic
objects; so observed macroscopic things will always follow in sequence without
skipping a step.
With the stochastic choice of the 1st component at tsc, the process will begin
again as shown in fig. 4. This also leads with certainty to a stochastic choice of
the 2nd component. That certainty is accomplished by the wording of oRule (1)
which requires that the probability per unit time is given by the current flow
J12 divided by the total square modulus at that moment. The total integral∫
J12dt is less than 1.0 in fig. 4, but it is restored to 1.0 when divided by the
total square modulus. It is therefore certain that the 2nd component will be
chosen.
Ready1 2
ReadyJ12
Realized
30
Figure 4
And finally, with the choice of the 2nd component, the process will resume
again with current J23 going from the 2
nd to the 3rd component. This leads
with certainty to a stochastic choice of the 3rd component.
The Counter with Delayed Observation
When the observer is not observing the counter, eq. 20 is written
Φ(t ≥ t0) = [C0(t) + C1(t) + C2(t) + C3(t) + ... etc.]⊗X (21)
where all the components following C0 are zero at t0. X is the unknown state of
the independent observer. Immediately after t0, current J01 flows from the 0
th
component to the 1st component, but not to higher order components because
the Hamiltonian only connects the 0th with the 1st. However, current J12 will
begin to flow into the 2nd component as soon as the 1st acquires a non-zero am-
plitude. The 3rd component will also receive current J23 when the 2
nd acquires
amplitude; so after a time t, the distribution might look like fig. 5.
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Without an observer the macroscopic detector behaves like a familiar quan-
tum mechanical object. It will be a superposition of many possibilities. If the
observer then interacts with the counter at time tob, oRule (2) requires that
eq. 21 becomes
Φ(t ≥ tob > t0) = C0(t)B
b + C1(t)B
b + C2(t)B
b + C3(t)B
b + (22)
+ C0(t)B0 + C1(t)B1 + C2(t)B2 + C3(t)B3+
where the second row is zero at tob. Again, physiological current flows down.
Horizontal current cannot flow in the second row because of oRule (4). If a
stochastic hit occurs at time tsc4 on the fourth component in the second row of
eq. 22, we will have
Φ(t = tsc4 > tob > t0) = C3(tsc4)B3 (23)
The state reduction in eq. 23 occurs with a probability that reflects the square
modulus of the component C3 in eq. 21. The Born rule is therefore verified in
this application of the oRules. Both the non-conscious property of a ready brain
state and its oRule (4) property are put to use in eq. 22.
Suppose the observer looks at the counter at the initial time t0 and then
leaves the room. While he waits in the hall outside his lab, the counter will
evolve as a quantum mechanical superposition of states like those in fig. 5.
When he returns to look at the counter, he will see just one result as in eq. 23.
So far as he is concerned, the counter behaved in an entirely classical way while
he was in the hall. He will not know if the system follows the oRules or the
Born rule of standard quantum mechanics. Furthermore, there is no experiment
that he can perform that will tell the difference.
A Film Record
Suppose we try to determine what happened in the absence of the observer by
taking a motion picture of the counter during that time. In that case the film in
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the camera would also evolve quantum mechanically, so every component Cm(t)
will have a film-strip correlated with it that is made up of separate frames. Each
frame is designated by the letter F , so the state equation after t0 will be
Φ(t ≥ t0) = F0F.F.F.F.C0(t) + F0F1F.F.F.C1(t) +
+ F0F1F2F.F.C2(t) + F0F1F2F3F.C3(t) + ...
where only the first component is non-zero at t0. The symbol F. (with a dot)
refers to a film frame that is not yet exposed. In the first component, only the
first frame is exposed to the counter state C0 and the remaining frames are as
yet unexposed. The camera is arranged so that a new frame is exposed as soon
as a new count is registered. So in the second component the first and second
frames are exposed when the second is exposed to the counter state C1. The
remaining frames in that component are unexposed.
To simplify the notation, let F0F1F2F3F.C3(t) be written F−3..C3(t) where
the sub-dash represents all the numbers before the number 3. The equation is
then
Φ(t ≥ t0) = [F0..C0(t) + F−1..C1(t) + F−2..C2(t) + F−3..C3(t) + ...]⊗X
where the observer is shown waiting in the hall. When the observer enters the
room and observes the counter at time tob, the interaction will yield
Φ(t ≥ tob > t0) = F0..C0(t)B
b + F−1..C1(t)B
b + F−2..C2(t)B
b + ...
+ F0..C0(t)B0 + F−1..C1(t)B1 + F−2..C2(t)B2 + ...
where the second row is zero at tob and increases in time. A stochastic hit on
the third component B2 in the second row at time tsc3 gives a reduction similar
to eq. 23
Φ(t = tsc3 > tob) = F−2..C2(tsc3)B2
This could mean that the observer has become directly aware of either the
counter reading C2, or the third frame of the film strip. It doesnt matter since
the two are correlated.
Let’s suppose that after his observation of F−2..C2(tsc3)B2, the observer
looks at the first frame at time tob1 to insure that it still reads 0 as he observed
before leaving the room. This will not require a stochastic trigger, for it involves
a purely classical inspection of the film strip that leads to
Φ(t ≥ tob1 > tsc3 > tob) = F−2..C2(t)B2 → F−2..C
′
2(t)B02
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where the realized brain state B02 is now conscious of both the 0 reading on the
first frame and the 2 reading in the third frame. Continuing the investigation,
the observer checks the second frame at time tob2. This also involves a classical
progression.
Φ(t ≥ tob2 > tob1 > tsc3 > tob) = F−2..C
′
2(t)B02 → F−2..C
′′
2 (t)B012
where the realized brain state B012 is conscious of the 0 reading on the first
frame, the 1 reading on the second frame, and the 2 reading in the third frame.
There is only one stochastic occurrence in this case, assuming the counter was
turned off when the observer came back into the room.
Even though the state reduction can only be accomplished in the presence of
an observer, the results can be verified by other means (the film strip) that may
or may not be immediately observed following the reduction. Non-local corre-
lations insure that there will be complete consistency with all post-reduction
investigations. So far as the observer is concerned, the detector and camera
behaved like classical instruments in his absence. As a result of his observation
and subsequent investigation, the observer is justified in believing that the ap-
paratus did not develop as a quantum mechanical superposition when he was
in the hall.
The Parallel Case
Now imagine parallel states in which a quantum process may go either clockwise
or counterclockwise as shown in fig. 6. Each component includes a macroscopic
piece of laboratory apparatus A, where the Hamiltonian provides for a clockwise
interaction going from the 0th to the rth state and from there to the final state f ;
as well as a counterclockwise interaction from the 0th to the lth state and from
there to the final state f . The Hamiltonian does not provide a direct route from
the 0th to the final state.
After being turned on at time t0, the apparatus becomes a superposition
Φ(t ≥ t0) = A0(t) +Al(t) +Ar(t) +Af (t)
where the components following A0 are zero at t0. The state A0 will then send
current into Al and Ar, which in turn send current to Af . A superposition will
develop along these lines until the interaction ends. There will be no stochastic
choice or state reduction because there is no observer present.
When the apparatus is being observed, the state will be
Φ(t ≥ t0) = A0(t)B0 +Al(t)Bl +Ar(t)Br
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where both the second and third components receive current directly from A0B0.
With nRule (4) in place, probability current cannot initially flow from either
of the intermediate states to the final state, for that would carry a ready state
into another state. The dashed lines in fig. 7 indicate the forbidden transitions.
But once the state Al (or Ar) has been stochastically chosen, it will become
a realized state Al (or Ar) and a subsequent transition to Af can occur that
realizes Af .
AfBf
AlBl Ar Br
Conscious
Ready Ready
Ready
A0B0
Figure 7
The effect of oRule (4) is therefore to force the system into a classical se-
quence that goes either clockwise or counterclockwise. Without it, the system
might make a direct second order transition (through one of the intermediate
states) to the final state, without the intermediate states being realized. The
observer would then see the initial state followed by the final state, without
knowing which pathway was followed. This is familiar behavior when the sys-
tem is microscopic7, but it should not be the case in macroscopic systems. The
7In Heisenberg’s famous example formalized by Feynman, a microscopic particle observed
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fourth oRule therefore forces the system into one or the other classical path, so
it is not a quantum mechanical superposition of both paths.
A Continuous Variable
In the above examples an observer plus oRule (4) guarantees that sequential
steps in the macroscopic system are not passed over. If the variable itself is
classical and continuous, then continuous observation is possible without the
necessity of stochastic jumps. In that case we do not need oRule (4) or any of
the oRules (1-4), for they do not prevent or in any way qualify the motion.
However, a classical variable may require a quantum mechanical jump-start.
For instance, the mechanical device that is used to seal the fate of Schro¨dinger’s
cat (e.g., a falling hammer) begins its motion with a stochastic hit. That is,
the decision to begin the motion (or not) is left to a β-decay. In this case, the
presence of an observer (looking at the hammer) forces the motion to begin at
the beginning, insuring that no value of the classical variable is passed over;
so the the hammer will fall from its initial angle with the horizontal. Without
oRule (4), or the observer, the hammer might begin its fall at some other angle
because probability current will flow into angles other than the initial one. With
an observer plus oRule (4) in place, no angle will be passed over8.
Grounding the Schro¨dinger Solutions
Traditional quantum mechanics is not completely grounded in observation inas-
much as it does not include an observer. The epistemological approach of Copen-
hagen does not give the observer a role that is sufficient for him to realize the
full empirical potential of the theory; and as a result, this model encourages
bizarre speculations such as the many-world interpretation of Everett or the
cat paradox of Schro¨dinger. However, when rules are written that allow a con-
scious observer to be given an ontologically complete role in the system, these
empirical distortions disappear. It is only because of the incompleteness of the
epistemological model by itself that these fanciful excursions seem plausible9.
at point A and later at point B will travel over a quantum mechanical superposition of all
possible paths in between. Without nRule (4), macroscopic objects would do the same thing.
8In another paper [6] the oRules are applied to two different versions of the Schro¨dinger
cat experiment.
9Physical theory should be made to accommodate the phenomena, not the other way
around. Everett goes the other way around when he creates imaginary phenomenon to ac-
commodate traditional quantum mechanics. If the oRules were adopted in place of the Born
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Limitation of the Born Rule
Using the Born rule, the observer can only record an observation at a given
instant of time, and he must do so consistently over an ensemble of observations.
He cannot himself become part of the system for any finite period of time. He
cannot become continuously involved. When discussing the Zeno effect it is said
that continuous observation can be simulated by rapidly increasing the number
of instantaneous observations; but of course, that is not really continuous.
On the other hand, the observer in an ontological model can only be continu-
ously involved with the observed system. That’s because it takes a finite amount
of time for the flow of physiological current to bring the observer on board to
full consciousness. So the epistemological observer makes instantaneous obser-
vations but cannot make continuous ones; and the ontological observer makes
continuous observations but cannot make instantaneous ones. Evidently the
Born rule would requires the ontological observer to do something that can-
not be realistically done. Epistemologically we can ignore this difficulty, but a
consistent ontology should not match a continuous physical process with con-
tinuous observation by using a discontinuous rule of correspondence. Therefore,
an ontological model should not employ the Born interpretation that places
unrealistic demands on an observer.
Status of the Rules
No attempt has been made to relate conscious brain states to particular neuro-
logical configurations. The oRules are an empirically discovered set of macrore-
lationships that exist on another level than micro-physiology, and there is no
need to connect these two domains. These rules preside over physiological detail
in the same way that thermodynamics presides over molecular detail. It is desir-
able to eventually connect these domains as thermodynamics is now connected
to molecular motion; and hopefully, this is what a covering theory will do. But
for the present we are left to investigate the rules by themselves without the
benefit of a wider theoretical understanding of state reduction or of conscious
systems. There are two rule-sets of this kind, the oRules of this paper plus the
nRules in ref. 4.
The question is, which of these two rule-sets is correct (or most correct)?
Without the availability of a wider theoretical structure or a discriminating
observation, there is no way to tell. Reduction theories that are currently being
rule, these flights of fantasy would not be possible.
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considered may accommodate a conscious observer, but none are fully accepted.
So the search goes on for an extension of quantum mechanics that is sufficiently
comprehensive to cover the collapse associated with an individual measurement.
I expect that any such theory will support one of the ontological rule-sets, so
these rules might serve as a guide for the construction of a wider theory.
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